leth

It's not really clear what this forum is for, there is already a forum for "introducitons" of sort. Is this forum here for questions that were often asked in those introduciton but were never answered because they were not exposed?

Sure these attachments offer what can be percieved as value, but value does not need attachment. Enjoyment does not require attachment either. Nor does moral understanding. In fact i would argue that attachment forms misconceptions about inherent understanding of ones values. And we can still sit in our easy chair, sipping coffee and listening to our stereo without having attachments to any of these things. And lack of attachment does not in any way mean there is a lack of ability to enjoy. Though I would prefer tea myself, i would for instance be contempt even without it. If i had a cup of coffee instead i could simply chose to not drink it. I don't see how lack of attachment would hinder positive emotions, yet attachment does seem to be the cause of many negative emotions. But what makes just seeking the comfort and content any different from some sort of hedonistic defeatism? Why does it seem that what feels natural is different depending on what people have studied or practiced? For a person that has practiced begging does it not become natural for that person? Then why does it seem from Daoist text that one shoud focused on studying and obtaining Ziran instead of just subjecting to some sort of hedonistic fatalism? Are they wrong? Or is Ziran not simply that? Why would Daoist texts point out that we need to study the De of Dao to obtain Ziran if Ziran is to seek that which is just comfortable at the moment? Can we not be content with that which is even though we would prefere something different? Why does content require prefered conditions? Is this idea of desires not related to attachment, and how is it that desires are to be reduced but not attachments? And does this work to get rid of deisres and attachment not give us greater content and thus perhaps greater comfort in life in general? Should we manipulate the conditions of our existance in the external or the internal or perhaps both? Does not the knowledge of how our surroundings work also allow us to understand our experiences to such a degree that we can be more contempt with them aswell as give use tools to alter the exterior to greater efficiency? Does this development in which we reduce our desires or our attachments not also alter what we could call natural in this context of the discussion? In a sense would this not make us more natural because we are able to be natural in more situations without requiring certain conditions? We have no reason to belive that the ability to form and recall memories aswell as memories themselves are in anyway a requiremnt of conciousness, so I fail to see how study of memory are in any way relevant to our understanind of conciousness. Furthermore our current science is inherently unable to analyse conciousness. Conciousness is inherently fundamental to the logic behind science, and just as science cannot analyse or define itself it cannot analyse the logic that defines it or the axiomatic fundaments that builds up to this logic. It is a problem that is similar to science inherent inability to define itself. Is there a thing to be concious for in the case of our conciousness? I don't really see a difference between an abstraction for us to have conciousness and an abstraction for Dao to have conciousness. Can you please explain what it is that has conciousness, and why Dao can not fit this abstraction aswell. And simple logic tells us that a superset of something will inherently have all the properties of it's subset. Everything is aspects of Dao, just as we are aspects of Dao. And we have an aspect of conciousness, why can not Dao have the aspect of Conciousness? In fact must it not follow that if we have the aspect of conciousness, must not Dao also have the aspect of conciousness if Dao has all aspects that we have? If we have aspects that Dao does not have, then Dao should not be said to be a totality of everything. What you are saying is simply not makeing any sense, you'd have to make a metalogical statement that revolutionises our current understanding of logic to make it reasonable from my point of view. Why must the mind be conciousness to have control? Would not the mind of a philosophical zombie also have control? Dreams are a good exmple of conciousness without control. Again it is not the conciousness that is the controlling agent, but the mind. Thus the statement that Dao has conciousness does not infer that it is in control. The mind is a completely different topic and a very complex one. Though of course the quesiton of mind follows this, but it is filled with many mysteries, and there is much we don't know. However as we are on the subject, Does not the idea that we can be said to have control, then must no Dao also have control. This control should be defined as the agency of which its exerts this control, i.e. the natural laws and the choices of all agents of free will that makes up Dao in accord to what we have discussed earlier. Insignificant we may be but it does not change the fact that our choices are part of that which controls the universe. How much power we have is really irrelevant to the concept of having power itself, our choices may be even more significant to the universe that that of ants are to us, yet this does not mean that ants are not part of the world, nor that we are not part of it. Ants have the ability to build complex nests which is an alteration of the environemnt it lives in, and to us this might seem insignificant and irrelevant, but it does not change the fact that it is a defacto change of reality. Thus ants can be said to be part of the factors that change reality no matter how isignificant they may be. Well there are five posibillites here the way I see it. 1. We are not conscious. 2. Dao is not a totality of everything. 3. Dao is conscious. 4. Your reasoning is inconcistent and thus illogical. (I mean no offense) 5. My logic is flawed and you have some sort of metalogical reasoning that is so far unheard of.

Ontology is not something put between reality and our minds, it is the study of existance and reality. I do not insert it, it is merely a description of what it is we are doing when we study or discuss the subject of existance and reality. It is a field of study which have arisen because we have inquires about existance and reality, and thus must figure out what it means to exist, or what it means to be real. And as it turns out this is a very complex subject, because our language uses the word exist in many different ways and it can become unclear what is meant with existance unless we specify which form of existance we are talking about. For instance dragons can be said to exist in one sense, because we have concived of them in our minds, and thus they do exists as figments of our mind. But they do not exist in reality, and therefore they are not real. The do not really exist in that sense. As we can see existance as a concept that comes in many shapes, a dragon both exists and does not exist depending on the context used or even our views of mental constructs and reality. And if we are to talk about what exists and what is real we need to define what we do consider existing or real and differentiate between these various uses of the word existance. That is why we use expressions such as mental constructs, physical and real. Likewise we must look at concepts such as object and thing which are often that which is said to exist. Ontological objects are such things that exists as independent objects in reality, and not such things that we have made up mental constructs of to be objects in our mind. And the cup is a common object often used to demonstrate that our conceptions of objects does not translate to ontological objects even if they can be said to be real, that is that the demarcation of the cup as a distinct object is not ontologicall but just a mental construct because we define the object by it's function to us and not by any sort of ontological demarcation. Thus we differentiate between physical objects and ontological objects. This is a convinent distiction if we are to talk about destinctions between reality as it is and how our minds percieve reality. No, molecules can not be said to be tangiable becase they are tangiable in large quantities What we do feel is the effect of a larger quantity of molecules, but never any molecule. In terms of physics masses are not even tangiable, but rather the interaction of the fundamental forces are. In no way are we able to distinguish this as a molecule, thus it can not be said that a molecules is in any way tangiable. It exsits as a mental construct to describe a certain phenomens of reality, and a substratum of that which is tangiable. Light is an interesting contrast to this, because it is the direct perception of one of the fundamental forces as we know them. It is however also just a mental construct that describes the behaviour of reality. Whether it is tangiable however depends on our mental constructs of light, we often think about what it is we are seeing rather than the fact that we are actually just percieving light reflecting from it. Actually i would say that softness is tangiable, an object is as much a mental construct as a property, but what we do immediatly percieve is not really the object but rather the properties of the object, we then determine the object by it's properties. If we are talking about tactile perception then an object feels soft, in terms of visual perception we see a form and a color, and we then translate this to the object itself. If we are to claim that we do not percieve properties of objects then we can't claim that we percive objects either, because percieving properties is a requirement for percieving objects. These are not uses of the cloud, we do not actually utilise the cloud itself, we utilise concepts which we have associate with the cloud, or effects that are related to the cloud. We utilise the water of the rain, we utilise the shadow of the cloud, never the cloud itself. If utilisation is to e defined to be so wide as you seem to do, then it does not really distinguish between anything att al, because it would be possible ot define a usage for anything, thus the distinctin is irrelevant and you are left with only two rules in your definition. I have demonstrated how these points in combination are not a reasonable way to distinguish between what is real or not. Here are some more examples. Aspects that are commonly understood to be real that your rules does not apply to: Limitation of the speed of light. The interaction between molecules. Things that your rules apply to that are arugably not real: Shapes Holes Reality itself does not change, it is our view of it that changes. Of course we can describe reality as changes but besides that, the factuality of reality does not change, it is our understanding of it that might change. Or are you to say that reality is only made up of what we percive it to be. Is reality then not subjective? The problem with this is that if we define this to be reality then it really loses it's function. It makes little sense to talk about reality as something external and we might just talk about it as reality. We might instead just use words such as I think, or for me it is. But this ofcourse is problematic becase we do communicate with other beings, and if we are to asume they are in fact not only figments of our own mind then there must exists something external, something we might call real, and it must be have some form of fundamental objective aspect. How can it be a construct without also being a reality? No I was refering to polysemy, some would say that polysemes are a form of homonyms but others would say is distinct from homonyms. Either way I am refereing to how a word can have different semes. And it is commonly known that words do have several semes. Colloquialy this is known as different definitions of the same word. Take for instance the word 'Tangiable' that you used. It might signify either somehting which is touchable, or something which is considered factual. There are plenty of examples of this and it can be noted if you read a dictionary. It's a common phenomena in language, and it doesn't really make any sense to disagree with it. A lot of misunderstandings arise because of different interpretions of polysmes and that is why metacommunication is important to defeat misunderstandings. It is my opinion that studying Daoist works without an understanding of polysemy is bound to lead to misconceptions.

Why does life need value? Are not attachments and value but mental constructs that are inherently irrelevant? Wouldn't our mind be a better mind if we transcend these attachments and use our understanding of our mind, our understanding of our sorroundings and our understanding of how the world works? Could this not be part of what is meant with Ziran? What is this harmony with our surrounding, and what is inner conflict really, is it related to oour understanding of the world (our surroundings/environment) and how it works? Mayhaps, scientifically the brain atleast seems connected to our conciousness, but so far conciousness itself is beyond scientific comprehension. This is an interesting mystery, but so far I remain agnostic. Does not the idea that De of Dao includes the De of humans, and that the entirety of everything must also include conciousness itself not mean that Dao can be said to have conciousness, or that conciousness is an aspect of Dao? Who said anything about controlling agent? Conciousness is not a controlling agent, traditionally the mind is seen as the controlling agent. But on that note, if we are controlling agents then there are controlling agents of the universe, and as such if we make the abstraction of a superset of all choices made than is that abstraction itself not the controlling agent of the universe together with the natural laws? If there is no controlling agent of the world, then we cannot truly have non-deterministic free will. But if we have non-deterministic free will, then we are part of that controlling agent of the world. And if Dao is the entierity of all, then this controlling agent must be part of it, and therefore it could be said that the De of Dao includes a part which is a controlling agent if we have non-deterministic free will, don't you agree?

It is but we have digressed a lot, especially since our questions are loosing it's original context. Therefor I feel the need to summarise and conclude a bit, I do belive I understand your position but you'll have to excuse me for any assumptions I make that are wrong. But i do have some questions. You seem to say that our choices are irrelevant in the grand scheme of things, does that mean that our choices does not matter, and why should we in that case not resort to fatalism or some sort of egotesitical fatalistic hedonism? What is it about making the right choices that make them the right choice in a more objective sense, i.e. not egoteistical sense, and why should we make those choices? What is it about us that gives us free will and makes us able to experience? Is conciousness part of the universe which follows deterministic rules, and if so must it not also follow deterministic rules? Is there no posibility that this mystery that is conciousness is more profoundly related to the concept of Dao in the sense of something greater than a mere deterministic system?

I don't see what is warranting this reaction. There are possible negative effects of meditation, this is a known phenomena in all cultures in which meditation has traditionally been part, in chinese it's known as zouhuorumo. Most traditions have an emphasis on the importance of correct practice and a good teacher atleast partly because things like this happens. Secondly I would like to say that in many traditions Meditation is definitly a form of self exploration. And I do agree that there is too little talk about this in the west apart from amongs psychologists who sadly have to deal with patients who have had this exprience. These psychologists are often not well versed in the practices and traditions of meditation which have extended knowledge of such phenomena.

Perhaps we would benefit more from your opinions and thoughts on the subject if you care to share them. The best way to make conversations more productive is to be a productive part of it.

This does not make them any less a mental construct. All concepts we have are mental constructs, ontologically speaking ther eis no such thing as a cup, sure the cup is tangiable, and sure ontologically that which the cup is made of does exist, but ontologically speaking it is not a cup it is simply a part of reality. The cup exists only as a mental construct yet it is tangiable. And so it is with many things, they are tangiable, but they are not in any way ontological objects. In fact with our current understanding, ontological objects are but an abstraction and are in no way tangiable. Who are we to say who is mad and who has a sound reasoning? What is it about certain kinds of reasoning which makes it superior to other kinds of reasoning? Only if we can agree that some sort of reasoning is unreasonable can we really come to terms with what is to be called mad and not. This is a very flawed way of reasoning. Whether something can be defined with words does not in any way say anything about it's ontological status. We can form words for anything, i could make up the word gobbledygook and claim it is an actuall ontological object but that doesn't make it so. Likewise we must first conceptualise soemthing to be able to form words for it, and considering how many things we have historically been unable to conceptualise that are now accepted as part of reality it is unfeaseble to say that we must be able to conceptualise seomthing or form a word for it if it is real. Before copper as a material was conceptualised was there no such thing as copper in reality? Whether something is tangiable or not is not a very good indication of whether it is real either. Molecules are not tangiable yet we take them as real, nor is light tangiable yet it is real to us. On the other hand Softness is tangiable, but is but an attribute and not in any way a real thing. As to usefullnes it is far from a good indicator, of course we can make up uses for anything if we so wish, but most would agree that a cloud is not very usable, yet we consider it real. And on the other hand many abstract concepts are very usable yet they are not real, math is very usable but it is not real it exists only as abstracta, similarly words thoughts are but mental constructs. So why would a combination of these three things be a good indicator of ontological status? Take softness for instance, it is a word, is tangiable and usable. Yet it is not considered real. And is not infeasable to say that there are discoveries to be made about reality that are not yet conceptualised and thus has no words for them, nor would they be tangiable or usable yet they would be real. A molecule or a quark for instance are modern discoveries which before their discoveries fitted this category. Not really, it's more about understanding context, words with more than one meaning is more or less abundant in most languages. To differentiate between different context might sometimes be hard but most people do seem to have this ability to some degree.

It is a mental construct, yes, but so are all words we use. We can never know whether our mental constructs are similar to any mental constructs that anyone else has, but we do have the facility to analyse our own concepts and the language we use to compare complex structures of interrelations between concepts. As such i think it is fair that I am seeing that which is written about laozi as far as I can understand. I do not see Dao, yet I see Dao. Do you see your own self, it is also abstract and can not be seen. The concept of we is also abstract but cannot be seen, yet we can see these things, because seeing is not the same thing as seeing. I can see this, just as I can see my self, or my own thoughts.

I see Dao everywhere, it is in my mind, likewise the concept of use is in my mind aswell. But ontologically speaking I can't see how we exist. We, and the self itself are mental constructs as much as the Dao is, and we interprete them as things. And yes 'thing' is but a mental construct aswell, but it is with these mental constructs that we interprete our experiences and communicate about them. And as such Dao is a thing as much as we are things.

Thoughts have a tendency to do that, but i find that good discussions and contemplation has a way of untagling them. But what is awareness then? What does the protein synthesis in our cells say about our conciousnes? What is will? What is a choice? What are comological forces? Is not quantum mecahnics a mystery without any answer for whether the unvierse is deterministic or not? If we do not know how the physical forces in the universe works, then how can we determine whether there is any sort of conciousness that is capable of non-deterministic free will involved in it's workings? These are mysteries to us, as is our own conciousness, and is not Dao therefore a mystery to us? If Dao is a mystery and conciousness is a mystery, then what can indicate whether Dao is concious or not? Even our choices, and our conciousness? The observable universe is not all that is, and we do not even understand how that which we can observe works. But that is just a side note. Our senses are not even capable of directly percieving the observable universe as it is known today, so our sense are even more limited then our extended knowledge. And that is also just a side note. Are the De of Dao not really made up of all our choices, and all our De, thus making the De of Dao also about choices? I hav found no indications of the opposite either, we can only specualte about conciousness outside ourselves at best, we can't even define conciousness in any sort of way that makes it analysable outside ourselves with our current technology and science. What if we expand into the galaxy and start to alter the cosmos on a much larger scale? What if we just destroy our own star, would that not alter the future of the whole galaxy because it drastically alters the gravitational dynamics of the galaxy? What if one single choice alters the outcomes of these possibilites? I would say that we most likely have the technology or if you will the possibility to change the Mississippi river from flooding now and then, and who knows what we will be capable of in the future, perhaps we could move alter Venus to make it habitable in some way. But on a larger scale, if we assume we use our conceptions of right and wrong could there be right and wrong for humanity, or for a certain group of people? What about a superset of all entities capable of making choices in the universe? That is to say that Dao has no right and wrong? That is to say that from the perspective of Dao, they are simply what they are, as there is no right and wrong? But what makes these choices right or wrong? And why is that any different from the De of Dao? Then what is the difference between the De of Dao and the De of Humanity? Is not De the path to Ziran? But if our De should reflect the De of Dao should we not care? Should the De of Humans be the same as the De of Dao for humans to attain Ziran? But does it not mean that the De of Dao includes the De of Humans? But then we do have a responsibility towards something larger than us? Is that not the idea of that which is external, and in the end will point towards Dao, of course the outermost apsect of Dao is far from us, but in every little detail there is an aspect of Dao, so caring for our immediate environment is that not caring for Dao? Would you say that there is no relation between our Ziran and The Ziran of Dao, What about the Ziran of our more immediate environment? Should we consider the Ziran of the ecosystem of the planet earth? In essence can it not be said that by looking at our more immediate environment we are looking at Dao? And thought it can be said that the vastness of Dao in it's entirety is far beyond our capabilities our ziran is to be inline with the De of Dao by being inline with the De of our immidiate surroundings? And is this not even if infinitesimal from the perspective of the Grand Dao not speaking of both the De and the Ziran of Dao, especially if we regard that our choices does infact alter the outcome of reality? Is not the doing of a group of people worthy of blame? Is humanity to blame for it's many faults? If we assume Dao as a superset of all choices, then does that not infer that Dao can be blamed in the sense that any group of choices cna be blamed?

How are we things? And how is Dao not a thing if we are things?

Is a thought not a thing? Can you put a thought in your pocket? Is a process not a thing? I can talk about a process as if it were a thing, we call it "a process", "the process" and we give it qualities and attributes as we would with other things. We an for instance say that the process was fast or slow. It's fair to say that we treat it as a thing in our language. And as such the process of making a sandwich is indeed a thing aswell. We can refere to it as the process of making a sandwitch, and give it attributes and talk about it as if it were a thing. Thing as a word is used in a very broadly way. We must differentiate between different conceptions of things.

I would argue that a change of will is in no sense an indication of Non-deterministic free will, but that is just a side note. What does Conciousness even mean? I see no reason to interprete the straw dogs as an indication that Dao has no free will. You posit that people who do not care do not have free will? Is free will directly connected to Empathy? Would you also say that the choices not made - that which we do not choose or perhaps rather chose not to do - is also part of dao? Is our choices not as much part of the De of Dao considering how reality itself forms according to our choices? How can you be sure that Dao is not concious? Is reality not formed by the non-deterministic wills of those that are concious? Does our will not change the deterministic system that the rest of the reality is? If there is right and wrong for concious minds, then how can there not be right and wrong on the larger scale? So from Dao's perspective, a hypothetical world in which all choices are made wrong would be no different from a hypothetical world in which all choices are made right? If that is so, then how does our choices matter at all? Should our naturalness not reflect that of Dao? Should our De not reflect the De of Dao? Is not reality itself also effected by the De of concious beings? You mean to say that we have no responsibility outside of following our own inner compass? Dao and the De of Dao is thus irrelevant? Yet it is fully possible for us to blame others, and if others also have choices can they not be said to e responsible and thus suspectible to blame? Would you say that being manipulated doing something as an effect of manipulation is always a choice and could never be blamed on someone else?

Is the limit of the mind not a limit? If there is no limit, then why don't we see people altering in extraordinary ways?

Whenever we speak about Dao we ar bound to our own limited minds, sure. But we have to use these limitations to point towards that which is not limited by our mental constructs. This is also why I atleast partly disagree with your description of Dao, I would interprete it to transcends reality as we understand it. You mean that the De of Dao is deterministic laws of physics? If the De of Dao is the deterministic laws of physics, how can any non-deterministic choice of free will be part of that De? If there is no non-deterministic choice of free will then all human behaviour must surely be the De of Dao? If there is non-determinisitc choice of free will, then how can any of those choice said to be part of the De of Dao yet not part of the De of Humans? You mean to say that the De of Dao is any possible outcome and any choice made no matter what? Does that no deconstruct the idea of De itself? Naturalness in the sense of deterministic behaviour is hardly the same thing as naturallness for a being with a non-deterministic free will. If there is no free will then surely whatever is done is De, If it can be said that people have free will, then what is De? What is natural if not to make a choice no matter what choice it is? What is it about our choices that make them natural or not? Comets occasionally collide with Earth, Humans occasionally kill other humans. What is the difference? What is the De of Humans if they have free will? What is the cause of that creates the choice? And if the De of Dao is the whole of all, must it not include the De of Humans?

This is the Dao Zang as transmitted through Yu Qing Huang Lao Pai, which claims heritage from Shang Qing lineage right?

Moral is a word, and a mental construct. It is something we use to understand our experiences. Ultimately there is no such thing as Moral. But that which we experience is, and whether Moral as we understand it is part of that depends a lot on how we conceptualise things. We use moral to make describe what we consider a correct conduct, but conduct ontologically there is no such thing as correct nor is there such a thing as conduct. But we interprete our experiences and sort them together using these mental constructs. And thus moral is a rather usefull word, because we do think about right and wrong, and we have opinions about behaviour. Dao is aslo a word, and also a mental construct, we use it to describe something which is beyond words however, something that is beyond our own experiences, something we can only grasp at using our innermost of expereinces. Dao has De, De is the modus operandi of Dao. In our limited way of thinking we can make a parabel to behaviour and to moral if we wish, but such a parabel will alwasy be flawed by our limitations of the mental constructs we use. In fact our minds are always limited by the mental constructs that we use, and this is true whenever we use language of any sort. But Alas, language is the only way to communicate, so we must accept these flaws and we must do our best to understand them and go beyond them. With such an understanding of the limitations of our lagnuage, and the way the words are used it should be possible to say and agree with both the idea that Dao has a moral and the idea that Dao does not have a moral. Because esentially it is only about how we percieve the mental constructs and how we apply them, but we should also realise that both of the statements are not really true, from an ontological standpoint the question itslef does not really make sense.

Our DNA alters with our behaviour, and physical training does activate certain aspects of our DNA, sure that is true for any sort of physical excercise. Not specifically Qigong. Cancer is a complex subject, but yes it seems that an active and healthy lifestyle seems to increase suppressor genes, but that is far from the same thing as guaranteed remisison from cancer. Everything is goverened by energy because the word energy is defined so that everything is energy. It is simply a word that means the basic fundamental working of the universe, thus because we have chosen this word to describe the basic working of reality it does indeed describe any form of phenomenon in the universe. Though this does not magically mean that anything can be done with energy, energy behaves in a certain way. And just because we our mind has the ability to alter certain aspects of our body doesn't mean it can alter anything to any degree.

I'm not sure I agree with this. De is the modus operandi of Dao. So De and Dao are interconnected. If it isn't the modus operandi of Dao it isn't De. So if we are talking about De we are talking about Dao. Are humans not part of the whole, and as such would not any part of the whole be part of Dao, and would not it's De be the De of the whole? Is there only Dao? Is there only De? If not then what is that which is not Dao, and that which is not De? If there is no other thing than Dao and De, then what is the point of De, and what is Ziran?

Neidan as a term seems to be far younger than the term wai dan, but the practices are older than both terms, the term jindan dao however can be said to be contemporary with wai dan and is often said to be comparable to nei dan. Though the practices seems to be older than the terms as far as we know considering how there are archeological finds that seems to suggest techniques that could be categorised as internal alchemy or atleast a precursor to internal alchemy as we now know it.

Good health is always visible for one with a trained eye. Someone with a good interal alchemy will look healthy because they are healthy.

It promises immortality, not immortality.

Thank you opendao, after reading what you wrote I agree with you.

Then truth is surely subjective, no? And can our preception of reality change over time? If it can, then truth is surely not absolute.