Simple_Jack

Who's the one promoting dogma now, gatito? That you are inherently biased towards buddhardharma when it clearly undermines a self-standing entity, aka. Atman, and as a consequence react by carrying out a smear campaign to disparage buddhadharma. The point is that her type of experience may very well be more common among practitioners of various traditions, even those of traditional and neo-Advaita; by extension many people in ordinary life could very well encounter these same experiences, but due to clinging and views of inherency, they do not penetrate further.

The point was to show that non-buddhists (you recall I mentioned Krishnamurti, right?) can have certain experiences that are similar to, but nonetheless, falling short of penetrating to the direct experiential realization of anatta.

Honestly, it's irrelevant.

Case in point, gatito.

No, this thread was meant to show that it is possible, for certain people, to not have any emotional hang-ups when differentiating the insights between traditions. Buddhardharma completely undermines both eternalism and annihilationism.

It's the same when receiving instruction on how to carry out the practice of vipassana, creation and completion stage, tregcho, etc. You wouldn't have an objection to my posting of Greg Goode's article above?

Bump.

Practice and theory should have a middle ground where the two meet.

From Greg Goode's website: http://www.emptinessteachings.com/selflessness.php The Emptiness of Self It is common to believe that there exists an unchanging, subjective core in people called a self, and despite the fact that a mind and body changes, people are believed to have a fixed and unchanging nature that is "me." The belief in a separate self is the root of suffering. It produces a fragmented life and the need to defend this self against a world of other separate people and things. In emptiness teachings, the relational, convention self does exist as a conventional designation and this poses no problem. It is a useful characterization and not the target of refutation. It is the inherently existent and separate self that is seen to own the mind and body. This separate and inherent sense of self is what is is refuted. The recognition of the fiction of the independent self is to discover an undercurrent of peace and freedom. It is to realize an open and unbroken existence. As the great poet Rumi once said, "You are not a drop in the ocean, you are the ocean in a drop." Deconstructing the illusion of the inherently subjective self requires a penetrating investigation. For it goes against the grain of how people automatically see themselves. There is the belief that while life events may effect me, there is a self, a subject that exists in isolation from what happens. It is as if there are two selves, one that things happen to, and another that remains unchanged by what happens, as an independent owner of the changing parts. If there is a toothache for instance, it is as if there is a self with a toothache, but another unchanging core self that is separate from the toothache that has the toothache, that owns it. For to own something, is not to be one with it. Are there two selves? Where is this unchanging self to be found? Likewise, thoughts, feelings, memory images and body sensations come and go, while there is a self that is believed to be the independent and unchanging owner of these mental and physical arisings. People will say that they have changed, but nonetheless there is believed to be a self that innately continues as an unchanging self-being or self-nature. This self that is often seen to account for all of the mind and body parts. If there was a self that owned the mind and body parts then there would also be two selves, one that was made of the mind and body complex and another that was their owner and that remained unchanged and untouched by these parts. However, one cannot be the owner of what one is identical to. It is redundant to say the least. This is part of the argument made regarding the illusion of the separate self. In Buddhist emptiness teachings, everything is seen to depend upon parts,conditions and upon thought to designate what cannot ultimately be singled out as its own entity. First, regarding parts, the parts of a self roughly include the body, thought, feeling, perception and sense consciousness (all of which are also empty). A self must be dependent upon and related to mind and body parts, or what could this self be? When a self is seen to inherently exist, it appears as if all of the parts are fused together into one unified substance or essence. If you try to find this intrinsic self nature, all you will find is dependent parts, which are also empty. The mind and body parts are fictionally believed to be owned by a self as singular overarching unity. Again, that would imply that there must be two selves, a singular, undivided self, and a self that is mind and body parts. The notion of a singular self depending upon parts is contradictory, because a self that is considered unitary cannot also be considered innumerable. The second dependency is dependence upon conditions. There are innumerable conditions that a person is dependent upon to arise, such as genetics, childhood experiences, language, culture, ever-changing situations, feelings, thoughts, perceptions, ad infinitum. A thought or feeling is also not self-created, but dependent upon content not considered to be thought. For example, daily events do not themselves think, but provide the condition of content for thought to arise. Since thought depends upon non-thought, thought is empty of its own nature. Conditions, such as food, air and water must also be present for a thought to arise. For if anyone goes without water, food or air, all mental and bodily functioning will cease. Thought then, does not independently exist, nor does emotion which mutually depends upon thought. If the conditions that a mind and body depend upon are cleared away, a functioning person would no longer continue to appear, just as a fire will not continue to burn without fuel, oxygen and thermal friction. A self does not exist as an independent entity. It is empty of self-establishment. For is a self, air? Is it water? Is a self the perception of a tree? A self cannot be singled out. An independent self is an illusion, its dependent designation is overlooked and mistaken to be an inherent, unity. Third, because there is not a self that exists independently, because everything exists in relationship to other things, a self and all phenomena must be designated by thought. A person is identified in relation to other things. Mental labels do not represent singular phenomena, but are abstractions. Conceptual labeling appears to grant a self and all phenomena, solid existence. We know what a person looks like in relation to having one shape and not another, by functioning and behaving one way and not another. A self is also a relative set of ever-changing relations and not a static entity. Conceptual thought is therefore used to designate what is actually an interrelational, impermanent phenomenon that is named a self. Nonetheless, this is not to refute a self's relative appearance and functioning. After the mutually exclusive dependent and independent reasoning is understood, the mutually exclusive sameness and difference reasoning comes into play. This reasoning involves the understanding that an inherently existent self would have to either be inherently the same as the mind and body parts or inherently different from them in order to qualify as a singular entity, as having its own independent and indivisible nature. If a self is considered to be a separate, independent phenomenon then its uniformity must be consistent to be valid. This implies that a self must be identical to the entire mind-body complex, or be able to maintain its self-identity being inherently different from them. Now if a self was both the same and different from the mind and body, this would still exclude it from having its own indivisible and unified nature, in other words, from being inherently existent. Regarding a self being inherently the same as the mind and body parts, an inherently singular self would also have to remain singular. If this was so then this self would have to be identical to every individual part of the mind and body to qualify and yet we can see that these parts are not even identical to each other. There cannot be one singular self if the aggregates are manifold. Something cannot have one singular nature and have the multiple features and characteristics of the mind and body complex. A leg or an cell for instance, is not thought to constitute a whole self. Nor could an inherently existent self be the same as a thought, a feeling, a sensation, all of which are fleeting. If they were the same then every new thought, feeling or sensation would imply a different self. It is nonsensical. For if an arm becomes cut, is the self cut? And if the mind and body parts are seen to belong to a self, then the self would have already been there, before the parts, and this would imply that there are two selves. For if the mind body parts belonged to a self, the owner and the owned would be different. Where is this independent and unified self? When one observes this sense of self, it appears to exist despite the mind and body parts. So is it different then this complex? Regarding inherent difference, if one maintains that the self is inherently different from mind and body parts, then it could not have characteristics of the mind and body that are conventionally designated to be a person. If a self was inherently different from its parts, then what would it be? The separate self is a false belief, a conceptual, emotional orientation that appears to cover mind and body parts while remaining independent from them. It mistakes superficial appearances and perceptions for the truth of the way things really are. When an independent self is looked for it is unfindable. This is why a separate self cannot be located. However, this unfindable self is not taken on faith. This realization involves a profound and practiced insight meditation that will continue in the next section. Sevenfold Reasoning on Selflessness Chandrakirti’s Sevenfold Reasoning on the Selflessness of Persons involves the sameness and difference reasoning and is a powerful method of deconstucting the inherent existence of the self. In this method one first learns to identify the sense of an inherent self. When a self is designated in dependence upon its parts, this is a valid designation. However, when an independent, separate and essential nature is attributed to a person, an essential selfhood is falsely claimed. In identifying the sense of an inherently existing self, the meditator needs to make sure that this target is the clear sense of a whole and independent self and not a mind or body part. One can later examine the parts (see next section below) that are taken to inherently exist. The fixed and solid sense of a self needs to be clearly identified and this takes reflection and investigation. So imagine feeling insulted. Right there, arises the sense of a self that has been wounded, the fixed me. I have been hurt. That I is your target of negation. In Emptiness Yoga, Jeffrey Hopkins writes about walking along a cliff and being afraid of falling off, as an example that brings forward the inherent sense of a self. Again, it is critical to first be able to identify this sense of a singular, inherently existent self in order to know what is being refuted. After identifying this self oneness, the sameness and difference reasoning is then used. The logic of the sameness and difference reasoning must also be worked with until it is clear. Next, the self is searched for among the mind and body parts, exploring all possibilities to see if this one singular essence can be found. Is this sense of a single independent self the same as a thought? Thoughts are different too and always changing, so was the self but that one thought? What about a feeling, a physical sensation, different parts of the body, the memory of an experience? Look among the mental and physical complex to see if this separate, overarching self is inherently the same as any of one of these parts. Is it absolutely different and unrelated? After disqualifying the various mind and body parts, is there any self left over? Keep looking for that essential self to see if it is identical to any of the mind and body parts. If your feelings are hurt, is the hurt feeling identical to that intrinsic sense of an unchanging self, to that sense of an unchanging you? That would mean that hurt feelings equaled a self, and that doesn’t make sense. If you were the hurt and the hurt went away, would you go away? If the hurt lessened, did the self diminish? Is that self but a feeling? Where is this core self, this controller? Where is the owner that makes these parts mine? If it can’t be found, then no self can be said to exist independent of mind and body parts with its own self-nature. Such independence would have to then be considered an illusion, a mirage, an abstract mental construct. Below, is a shortened outline of Chandrakirti’s reasoning that is used to refute the existence of an inherent self. Typically, these reasonings begin with a simple object such a car or as the flower illustrated on the previous page to work up to this exercise. Sevenfold Reasoning is a powerful emptiness strategy that over time, leads to the realization of the absence, the emptiness of an inherent self and all other phenomena. Notice that all of these reasonings, are based upon variations of the argument of inherent sameness and difference. This is because implying an inherently existent self demands that this self be identical to or independent from mind and body parts, or it can only be a dependent designation. The self is not inherently the same as the parts of the mind-body.Since the inherent self is seen as one singular unity, then the aggregates would be one, but instead we find diversity. This would require that the self be identical to each and every part but it cannot be, because the parts are plural. If the self was identical to the parts, there would not be one self, but multiple or plural selves. This sameness position would also imply that you could point to your hand for instance, and it should indicate the same thing as referring to the self, but it does not because a hand is designated as a part of a self. If the self was identical to the mind-body parts, then referring to a self would be an unnecessary duplication. There would be no need to say my mind or mybody as everything would be synonymous. And if a singular self was identical to the parts of the mind and body, then if thoughts changed or a body aged, it would produce a whole new self. Even cutting your hair, would result in an entirely new self. The self is not inherently different than the parts of the mind-body. If it were, there would be no mind or body connection upon which to refer to or designate the self, as there could be no relation between them. If a self was inherently different than the mind and body complex, that would mean that if all of the mind and body parts were removed, there would still be an independent person left over. But what would it then be? Furthermore, if a self existed autonomously, it could just as well belong to someone else’s mind and body parts, or vice versa, as there would be no connection between them. Now, if one imagines that a self could be held together by some kind of connecting substance, then this “glue” would also be a part and we’d be back to the same incoherence of inherent sameness and difference. The self is not inherently dependent upon the parts of the mind-body. This argument refutes the idea that the self exists separately from the mind and body parts,while still depending upon them. It seems as if this is the case in the sense that although the self is often seen as depending upon the parts, it is also essentially believed to remain unchanged. It is as if the self is supported by the mind and body without any accountability for being dependent upon them, changed by them. The inherent self is seen to remain the same, dependent and yet its own thing. Furthermore, if the self was inherently dependent, it could not meet the mind and body parts. So this argument is contradictory and is a variation of the refutation of the self being inherently different from the parts. The self is not an inherent substratum upon which the mind-body parts depend. This reasoning addresses the self as if it is a separate entity that supports and enables the mind and body parts without being connected to them. If this was so, then there would be nothing to prevent the self from supporting someone else’s parts. If there was an inherent substratum that the mind and body depended upon, then it could not actually contact the parts of the mind and body and maintain its inherent integrity. Additionally, if the self is seen as a true base, then what created it? The self is not inherently the possessor of the parts of the mind-body. That which possesses cannot be the same as the possessed. The very idea of the self as a possessor automatically implies an inherent, fundamental difference between the self and the mind-body parts. If the mind and body were identical to the possessor, they would not need to be possessed, as they would already be equivalent. If I inherently possess my thoughts for example, then there would need to exist thoughts and a possessor of them that stood on its own, or why call it a possessor. But in such a construct, they could never meet. A self must be dependently designated by mind and body parts rather than be an independent possessor of them. For if you clear away the the mind and body parts, what would there be to possess? The self is not inherently the collection of the parts of the mind-body. If it were, that would imply that the collector (self) and the collection would be inherently the same but are clearly different or there would be no need to distinguish the two. A collection also has to have parts that are not identical or why even call it a collection? This takes us back to the sameness argument, the contradictory notion of collective parts as equaling one intrinsic self. For there would then be many selves and not one inherent identity. Any imagined glue or unifier holding a collection together must also be a part and does not change the fact that the collection is not of one nature. Furthermore, if any part of the collection changed, such as having different thoughts or hairdo, the self would also change and there would not be one self, but many different selves. The self cannot then be said to exist as an independent collection of mind and body parts. The self is not inherently the shape of the parts of the body. If it were, then mental characterists could not be a part of the self, as inherent existence requires singularity. Also, if the shape of the body changed in any way, including growing and aging, losing or gaining weight, the self would be considered a different self. Additionally, the body is a composite of different and multiple shapes and cannot be equivalent to the concept of an inherent self, unchanging and unitary. If a self is neither the same nor different from mind and body, how can one establish its existence? What is left over? This is not an argument that refutes dependently or relatively existent persons or subjects, but the notion of its independence. When one deeply examines the appearance of a separate self over and again, the illusion falls away and with it, fear and suffering cannot be sustained as they were. Life becomes a play of empty phenomenality with no substantial self seen to be running the show. The Thinker, Feeler and the Doer There are five mental and physical aggregates and they include the body, consciousness, perception, feeling and thought. A self that did not include these parts would not be considered to be a functioning human. Despite the ever-changing character of the mind and body parts, they are believed to constitute the inherent self or subject. The mental aggregates are sometimes identified with as the feeling of the I, as in believing that you are your thoughts or body. This identification with different aggregates is not the perceived inherent self being refuted. This self is seen to cover the aggregates, to own them. Nonetheless, it is extremely important to see each of these mind-body functions as empty. It is argued in emptiness teachings, that there is no subject of an object, just as fire cannot arise or endure independent of fuel. A thinker does not independently exist. If a thinker existed as a thing in itself, it would yield an odd result. A thinker would exist without objects of thought and thought would exist without a thinker. To think, is to think about something, a non-thinking object to think about, including thoughts as objects to think about. The thinker and objects of thought are a process that they cannot be separated. Neither exists in itself, and so both are empty. Without content, a designated thinker could not be thinking, and without a thinker, thought would exist independently without being connected to anyone, which is unfathomable. And if thought did inherently exist, why would it even need a thinker? Furthermore, if the thinker and objects of thought were to independently exist, this would also mean that neither could undergo change and yet, never is this cognitive-type movement the same, not for one instant, just as a burning flame is not. The thinker and object of thought co-arise ,along with other innumerable dependent conditions in what is called thinking. There is no independent subject or object. This means that there is not actually, ultimately, a thinker of thoughts. Therefore, as a thinker cannot even know or perceive itself, and as it cannot be itself, a thinker cannot reasonably be said to produce an objective product of knowing. For as a thinker does not exist in itself and with its own apprehending power, then what knowing can it grasp? So no one can purely be said to be a thinker, let alone a knower. Likewise, emotions and the feeler of them do not exist independently, as a feeling subject is dependent upon non-subject, upon non-sensory content. Emotions are also related to and conditioned by what is a relative object of emotion. Feelers and emotions are not self-contained entities, but the dependent relatedness of mental and physical sensations and objects that extend beyond the mind and body. A feeler is not a fixed, changeless container waiting to be filled. Feelings arise when conditions are present. And if the feeler and feelings did exist autonomously, as with thought, there would be feelings running around without anyone to feel them and a feeler without anything to feel. Just as the subject is dependent upon an object, an object requires a subject. It is practical to make these distinctions, but misleading to take these distinctions literally. Feeling cannot grasp itself and therefore feeling too, does not have the separate nature to objectively or purely feel. There is no inherently independent entity that is the feeler of feelings. They are dependent arisings. These same arguments apply to all of the mind and body aggregates, including the idea of an inherently existent doer, which partially includes the body. Independent of action there is no actor and without an actor, there can be no human action. Like all phenomena, the doer and the doing are dependently arisen. One becomes a doer through the action of doing, through things being done. One is a worker through the actions involved in working. One is a gardener through the actions of gardening. If a doer existed in itself, it couldn't relate to anything, which would exclude it from being a doer. Instead, everything is relational and a separate agent cannot be located. Conceptual language falsely superimposes the sense of an independent subject, a self as both its own subject and object. Even the act of visual seeing, is believed to be its own thing. But if sight does not see itself, if what is seen does not see, there can be no independent seeing. Hearing does not hear itself but depends upon so called sound waves. This lack of of an essential nature goes for all of the senses and for every mind and body feature. So it can be reasoned that if the parts of a self can’t be found to exist inherently, then neither can the self. There is neither one nor many because nothing has an essence of its own.

It's understandable, since the intellectual discipline required of accurately understanding buddhadharma, is demanding.

More double standards, gatito?

Tathagatagarbha and alaya [-vijnana] are two sides of the same coin.

It just means that the 5 skandhas, 18 dhatus, 12 ayatanas are non-arising. The emptiness of the dependently originated phenomenon are not-two (advaya).

Bump.

Bump.

Case in point, dawei.

I'm wondering, if you are just falling into a trap of interpreting Suzuki's and Goddard's translation of tathagatagarbha, as "universal mind", into a shared transpersonal field.

By consciousnesses I mean tongue consciousness, ear cosciousness, nose consciousness, eye consciousness, body consciousness, mental consciousness.

Correct. If you are a Vajrayana practitioner than disregarding the above is understandable, but if you were someone who practiced vipassana for example, then my assertion is valid. This is missing the point, consciousnesses arise due to the meeting of a sense organ and a sense object, positing anything otherwise, according to buddhardharma, is eternalism a la Hinduism.

This is eternalism. There is no over-arching, self-standing, uber consciousness in buddhadharma. All cognitions are personal and dependently originated.

I based that mostly off of this post here: http://thetaobums.com/topic/33591-the-superiority-of-tantra-to-sutra/?p=523619 I wrote: In Madhyamaka, on a conventional level, consciousness arises only if there is a meeting of a sense organ and sense object. you wrote: That's the irrelevant bit of the whole thing. What difference does any of that make at all. Having taken refuge and considering oneself a "Buddhist practitioner for over 25 years" does not necessarily mean an individual is engaging in the view of buddhardharma.

Hardly, as it's self-evident in your posts. Anyone, who are themselves not biased towards buddhadharma, can see this.

The double standard and logical fallacies, made by gatito, stems from gatito's bias towards the philosophy and praxis of buddhardharma; due in part to how buddhadharma undermines an eternalist position of a self-standing entity, in this case Cit i.e. "Consciousness/Awareness".

Please, stop engaging in double standards and logical fallacies, by admitting of your bias towards buddhadharma.

Other than the logical fallacies and double standards made in this thread by Gatito you can read the "Debunking a Creator" thread starting from page 16 http://thetaobums.com/topic/32820-debunking-a-creator/page-16.