The Art of War

[Michael Sternbach]

I agree, with that,but I would like to see eventually the principles spelled out in a non war based context , at some other time. I figure it would be difficult to render without the basic pretext of being in military conflict.

I would call the AoW a manual of conflict management. Many of its tenets also translate to fighting scenarios on a much smaller scale such as studied in the martial arts. I already mentioned several such parallels. But "war-like" situations are also frequently part of the business world, so the AoW is sometimes part of the curriculum for company managers and the like, as Brian reminded as. I invite readers of this thread who see parallels to their personal areas of expertise to share them.

 

The AoW, while very wide in its scope, is not as universally applicable as some other Daoist books. It remains a manual of strategy. It often derives its teachings from more general principles, especially the interaction of Yin and Yang, which i.e. Lao Tzu talks about.

 

... But anyway,.... over time, the relative strength of the entrenched position has been reversed , fortifications and battleships outmoded ,to a degree, and so we do need to be rather flexible in what we consider to be ... high ground, etc. High ground may not be mounds , it may be airspace , or satellite orbit , or posession of an antidote to a poison. So its our flexibility as the reader which really preserves the validity of much of the overt text content.

Yes, that's exactly what I meant in my previous post. The principles always remain valid, but we must consider how they apply to a modern context. It is the nature of the fundamental texts of Daoism (including the Dao De Ching, I Ching etc) that they are relevant to myriads of analogous expressions of the basic principles they provide. Thus their relevance is unlimited by time and place.

 

One thing Id like to remind, when folks use particular engagements to validate the direction offered by the text, say,, Vietnam- is that both sides are dealing with the same principles , not just the victor as determined by historical review. And theres nothing in the Art of War, which is unique technique or novel rationale.

Every loser also tried these suggestions,, tried to do the rational thing (as they saw it )

Well, surely both parties in a conflict are subject to the principles outlined by Sun Tzu. The one who understands them better and more skillfully uses them is the one who has the strategical edge.

[Marblehead]

I was going to respond to Stosh's post but I will hold for now.

[Stosh]

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Edited January 21, 2016 by Stosh

[Marblehead]

And you get rocks thrown down upon you if you don't take the high ground.

 

Israel made sure it kept the high ground it took after the 1968 war.

[Stosh]

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Edited January 21, 2016 by Stosh

[Marblehead]

 If warring really is a natural state of affairs then its never really won anyway.

Yep.  The winner's winning will always create new enemies.

 

That is one of the things that made Alexander so Great.  His last choice was always engagement.  He much preferred his enemy's surrender without force.

[Marblehead]

Concealment and flexibility are very important concepts in this chapter.

 

In our everyday life concealment isn't all that import in most cases but I suggest that flexibility is.  Flexibility allows us to casually adjust to changing circumstances.

 

I think this is important in our spiritual life as well.  If we find that certain beliefs are not bringing us inner peace we should be able to casually change paths.

[Stosh]

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Edited January 21, 2016 by Stosh

[Marblehead]

Well, personally, I agree with you.  I am an Anarchist after all.

 

But then, we are studying The Art of War, so I must set my personal beliefs aside for the discussion.

 

Even our George Washington tried to follow the concepts of The Art of War.  And while it is true that he lost every battle he engaged in, he still won the war.  (He sneaked up on them while they were drunk and sleeping and destroyed them.)

 

Empires rise and fall.  These risings and fallings are generally a result of wars.

[Stosh]

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Edited January 21, 2016 by Stosh

[Marblehead]

actually I think he was admirable, not for being on the 'winning side' but for abdicating his position of power for the sake of the nation setting a precedent we still should honor. 

Yes, if nothing else, that has to be said in his favor.  He realized that there was noting to be gained by jumping out of one boiling pot of water into another pot of water.  The majority of the wise at that time really wanted a democracy but they also wanted to pay tribute to Washington.

 

 

And a personal note:  My birth day is on the same day his is.

[Stosh]

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Edited January 21, 2016 by Stosh

[Marblehead]

Maybe my history is uninformed, whats the second pot of water ? I thought he felt he had served his bit and it was up to him whether to let go of the presidency... and did so ,, rather than defeat the principle of govt leadership being a temporary service for the people.

Washington was against the concept of a Monarchy.  We had just divorced our self (the nation) from the Monarchy because it was felt to be a bad way to rule a country.  To be appointed King would have really changed nothing.  But he had no problem being elected (appointed) President.  The will of the people and all that stuff.  So the second pot of water would have been America becoming a Monarchy.

[Michael Sternbach]

I know you guys all waited for this eagerly... Here it is: My in-depth interpretation of chapter VI!

 

"

VI. Weak Points and Strong

1.

Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted."

 

This makes sense right away. Although there can be exceptions. In Eiji Yoshikawa's novel

Musashi

, the hero purposefully shows up for a duel several hours late. His opponent is totally unnerved from waiting; to unsettle him further, Musashi comes running at him while yelling and wielding a paddle he had transformed into a weapon during the boat trip to the island of the fight. He strikes him down just like so.

 

I think, the gist of Sun Tzu's teaching is to enforce your conditions on the opponent. Thus you are taking the initiative and optimize your possibilities. This starts with choosing time and place.

"2.

Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him."

 

Oh thanks, that's exactly what I meant.

 

"3.

By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near."

 

In the first case, using a bait. The story of the Trojan horse comes to mind. In truth, a gift from an enemy would immediately raise suspicion. Subtlety is key here.

 

If, as a martial artist facing an assailant, I purposefully leave a part of my body uncovered ("frame" it), I can be pretty sure, that's where the attack will come in - making it so much easier for me to block and use the opponent's momentary preoccupation to drive home a juicy counter.

 

In the second case, the idea is to hurt the opposition whenever they dare approach. Bruce Lee's stop kick to the knee comes to mind.

"4.

If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move."

 

Once again, responding to Yin with Yang, or vice versa.

"5.

Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected."

 

Surprise, surprise!

 

In close combat, you might stomp on the adversary's foot for starters. It's usually a totally unexpected move.

 

Again, the same principle could be applied in quite different situations...

"6.

An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

7.

You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you only attack places which are undefended.You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions that cannot be attacked."

 

Make sure that your fullness meets with their emptiness. Another way of using Yin and Yang.

 

"8.

Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack."

 

Use the opponent's unavoidable openings while avoiding to offer any yourself. That's the theory, at least.

"9.

O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands."

 

Hehehehe.

"

10.

You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy."

The former again means using your Yang (advance) against their Yin (weaknesses). The latter means using Yin (retreat) to get away from their Yang (chasing you):

"

11.

If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he will be obliged to relieve."

 

Luring them out of their dens that way is certainly effective. (You won't be making friends though.)

"

12.

If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable in his way."

 

Obstructions of an unexpected nature probably work best.

"13.

By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while the enemy's must be divided.

14.

We can form a single united body, while the enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

15.

And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

16.

The spot where we intend to fight must not be made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible attack at several different points; and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be proportionately few.

17.

For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.

18.

Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against possible attacks; numerical strength, from

compelling our adversary to make these preparations against us."

All these paragraphs revolve around "divide and conquer" - a recurrent theme in the AoW.

"

19.

Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.

20.

But if neither time nor place be known, then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest are separated by several LI!"

 

In contrast, we should be keeping our forces together - not only in any kind of battle, but generally in life.

 

And knowing time and place of an altercation is second best to deciding them ourselves.

"21.

Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved."

 

That's because the soldiers of Yueh suck at strategy. Mind you, they haven't read the AoW (and this thread).

"22.

Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the likelihood of their success.

23.

Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable spots."

 

The way a boxer throws a few jabs without real commitment, just to learn his opponent's reactions.

"24.

Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is deficient."

 

Spy on the opponent...

"25.

In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains."

 

...and avoid being spied on yourself.

"26.

How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend."

 

Use their force against them.

"

27.

All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved."

 

For they only see the parts, not the whole. (Yeah, we talked about that before.)

"

28.

Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances."

 

Every situation is different, so as to be able to adjust to them all, you need to reside in formlessness. (Who said that the AoW isn't a Daoist text?!)

"29.

Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

30.

So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to strike at what is weak.

31.

Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

32.

Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions."

 

Be adaptable like water. (Right, Daoism has been called the water course way by Alan Watts.)

"

33.

He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain."

 

Heaven-born and water-borne.

"34.

The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make way for each other in turn. There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing."

 

Things ever move in circles, they change, come back again... Being able to adapt to change, yet to retain oneself: That's the

Art of Life

.

 

Edited September 11, 2015 by Michael Sternbach

[Marblehead]

Excellent Michael!

 

Your comments to line 1. brought to my mind a movie I watched last night.

 

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt3399916/

 

Dead Land.

 

About the Maori in tribal battle.  The most common weapon was something that looked like a ping pong paddle.  Made of stone; not too sharpened along the edges; made for crushing bone.

 

In one scene the old man was telling the young lad how to fight.  He said "Get your opponent angry so that he looses his concentration.  Say something really bad about his mother.  That always works."

[PLB]

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite variety of circumstances.

 

This makes perfect sense and is also very hard to do. What is being described only works in groups if enough of the participants understand what is happening around them. As with the other observations made in this part of the book, it is a hollow bang on the coconut absent a group of people who think a certain way together in real time.

 

 

[PLB]

Well, personally, I agree with you.  I am an Anarchist after all.

 

But then, we are studying The Art of War, so I must set my personal beliefs aside for the discussion.

 

Even our George Washington tried to follow the concepts of The Art of War.  And while it is true that he lost every battle he engaged in, he still won the war.  (He sneaked up on them while they were drunk and sleeping and destroyed them.)

 

Empires rise and fall.  These risings and fallings are generally a result of wars.

I take your point in general about George Washington but would like to point out some ass kicking his troops did in New Jersey after taking Trenton. Those little raids did a lot of damage to the forces opposing him. Very SunTzu

[Marblehead]

I take your point in general about George Washington but would like to point out some ass kicking his troops did in New Jersey after taking Trenton. Those little raids did a lot of damage to the forces opposing him. Very SunTzu

Yes, I wasn't dismissing what those troops did with their hit-and-run tactics.  Gorilla warfare.  And they were very good at it.  After all, most of them were guys who had spent their entire life living off the land.  And gorilla warfare causes a great de-moralizing of the enemy's troops.  And fear too because most of them had never experienced that type of warfare before.

[Michael Sternbach]

We continue our mindbogglingly profound exploration of Sun Tzu's masterpiece with chapter VII.

 

VII. Maneuvering

 

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.

 

2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp.

 

3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

 

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation.

 

5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

 

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.

 

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch, doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

 

8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

 

9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.

 

10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

 

11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

 

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

 

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

 

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account unless we make use of local guides.

 

15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you willsucceed.

 

16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.

 

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness that of the forest.

 

18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability like a mountain.

 

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

 

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotmentsfor the benefit of the soldiery.

 

21. Ponder and deliberate before you make amove.

 

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.

 

23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongsand drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.

 

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular point.

 

25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling large masses of men.

 

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

 

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

 

28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning; by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

 

29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

 

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of retaining self-possession.

 

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.

 

32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying circumstances.

 

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

 

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

 

35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

 

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

 

37. Such is the art of warfare.

Edited September 16, 2015 by Michael Sternbach

[Marblehead]

Okay.  I'll start with line 1.

 

1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign.

 

Paraphrased:

 

In business, the manager receives his commands from the owner.

 

This, of course, should be a given.

 

How well the manager utilizes his assets will determine the success of the business.

[canacan]

Art is war.

War is not art. It is so much more.

 

The art of war is neither art nor war.

Well, I am wrong here. Literature and poetry are indeed art.

Edited September 16, 2015 by canacan

[Marblehead]

I thought I would add a couple more comments:

 

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

 

Isn't this just as true today as it was 2,000 years ago?  We need understand clearly and completely what it is we are agreeing with.

 

And:

 

35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. ...

 

There will always be scam artists offering things are are just too good to be true.  I consider anyone who tries to take from me through scams of any sort to be my enemy.

[The Observer]

Im not sayin Alex isnt considered to have been great as a military man, but he did run around killing people to satisfy a lust for power , and fail to see how I personally can consider it great. Too many people think the height of greatness is the domination of everyone else. So while I agree he was very successful, and may have preferred everyone else to surrender ,rather than kill them. The ultimatum was still that if his desires werent met , he would try and possibly succeed , at killling you. Is there something admirable about that ? I think not. I dont care for threats against me, I dont like the threatener, my hackles stand up and I get ready to push back, does any other man feel differently?

I would argue that his accomplishments were admirable. Remember, thanks to Alexander the Great Greek culture spread to the rest of the Middle East, even to India and East Asia (to an extent). The fact that he tried marrying his Macedonian officers to the Persian nobility showed that he more in mind than just conquest, but rather the unification of the known world.

 

There is a Monty Python skit that illustrates a very valid point about empires; they are bad for the conquerors, but in their wake they leave new, open trade routes and the spread of new ideas!

[Michael Sternbach]

I would argue that his accomplishments were admirable. Remember, thanks to Alexander the Great Greek culture spread to the rest of the Middle East, even to India and East Asia (to an extent). The fact that he tried marrying his Macedonian officers to the Persian nobility showed that he more in mind than just conquest, but rather the unification of the known world.

 

Or the consolidation of his power.

[The Observer]

Or the consolidation of his power.

Unification or consolidation the thrust of the act is similar. I've often thought of conquerors and empire-builders as unconcious agents of progress; maybe Ghengis Khan realized this when he proclaimed himself the Whip of God to the Muslims he encountered.