Wave Structure of Matter

[Michael Sternbach]

Monads exist on every plane, from subatomic ones to the levels of consciousness.

 

All these are analogous to each other in the neo-Platonic/Hermetic view. "As above so below."

 

There is nothing illogical about it. And even though physical reality can be seen as a product of consciousness, it is quite real in its own right.

[Karl]

Monads exist on every plane, from subatomic ones to the levels of consciousness.

 

All these are analogous to each other in the neo-Platonic/Hermetic view. "As above so below."

 

There is nothing illogical about it. And even though physical reality can be seen as a product of consciousness, it is quite real in its own right.

I would need a bit more information to understand how you were using that term. Are you saying existence is a product of consciousness ? That's usually how monad is used.

[Brian]

Ehh...that's not how the Leibnizean monad is used. The Leibnizean monad is said to be "windowless"---not interacting with anything per-se but self-configuring under the impetus of the universal prime-mover.

 

More specifically, the system of monads was designed to answer onotlogical and mereological questions. Questions concerning what is a proper part of something else. Likewise, where can there be subjects and aggregates and how we can differentiate and demarcate what-is-what.

 

After having spent more time on this, I am more inclined towards McTaggarts mereological ontology---but I have a gripe with his his method because he constructs the idea and then uses it to project restrictive conclusions about the universe at large (I'm willing to make asymptotic projections but his method doesn't do that since his construction of an ontological unit requires some gerrymandering). Regardless, McTaggart would be considered a hyper-essentialist (so you wouldn't find much to like in his work).

 

McTaggart has more in common with the above mention of monads (whereas monads are "windowless", McTaggarts idea of substance would be considered all window). In this way, it sounds similar to the distortion that I made about "monads" when relating them to the musical tetrad. I haven't looked too deeply into Proclus's work concerning henads but I think I recall you criticizing it as a book which was abstract to the point that it didn't talk about anything tangible. This, though, probably is a bit closer (to the above mention) than the canonical monads of Leibniz but it's not quite as open as McTaggart's system.

 

For any of these cases, existence is not a product of consciousness. Consciousness, however, is considered present alongside all existing things in some way. There is a generally unexplained coexistence of the two.

 

Whatever the case, I have been drawn more round-about to liking the scholastic metaphysics. Which, actually, has a bit in common with what you've mentioned about Rand's metaphysics (though I haven't read any in-depth things about Rand's metaphysics).

 

In any case, the scholastic use of potency instead of possibility is a key point that aligns to the article quite well. When we talk about possibility, we get a projective view possible things out of which one "actual" thing is selected. This has led to a number of the fallacy-ridden discussions about alternate universes. "Potency", in the scholastic metaphysic, though, will have the totality of an objects future be contingent upon the potentials that exist within it yet haven't been manifested. And so, the development of an object over the course of different conditions set upon it over time, will yield an "act" out of potency. In this case, the "act" is simply the act of being in the present moment in some way. The in-some way is what makes different things distinct.

 

On this point, we should be able to see that the discussion of Milo Wolff's work, if we want to explore philosophical issues, ought to be considered in this light. There is a very empirical base and it doesn't jump to the abstract stuff of "information" or of discrete object-demarcations. There is a fuzzyness to objects born out of the interacting force-centers in a way similar to the act of concrescence in Whitehead's process metaphysics. (And the force-centers are more like nodes and specific conscious things---though I'd speculate that consciousness can be correlated to the degrees of freedom that the nodes have relative to the waves sent out and back).

 

So, instead of Leibniz, we're probably looking more at an Aquinas, Whitehead, Peirce and (maybe) Heidegger-styled scheme of metaphysics rather than anything officially Platonic.

Very nice, A&P.

[Zhongyongdaoist]

In the first video, at the 11:30 mark, we get to hear why Maxwell didn't figure into the final draft.

Thanks, I was looking at the above and copied it to reply and the copy contained this material:

 

Actually, with a bit more looking and cross-checking the sources, it seems that Milo Wolff was actually thinking in a way analogous to what I was posting above. Though, whereas I was focusing on straight metaphysics, he was focusing on the application of metaphysical thinking to the resolution of problems in the applied geometry of physics.

 

If we look in Clifford's papers (the ones cited in Wolff's article):

https://archive.org/details/mathematicalpap00smitgoog

 

We get a run-down of a way of thinking about space that is non-Euclidean and non-"non-Euclidean" (In the sense of Lobatchevsky, Riemann, and other axiomatic theoreticians). But, instead of reworking other well-developed theories, it appears to have been his intention to build a theory from what would be (ideally) a more accurate conception of space and (as a corollary) matter.

 

In this way, Maxwell's use of electromagnetic fields is an approximation of a phenomena that doesn't get to the empirical root of what we're talking about. Likewise, information theory doesn't get to the empirical root of what we're talking about.

 

Which kind of makes sense if anyone remembers Drew's mile-long writings on the musical understanding of the universe, non-commutative complementary-opposite harmonics, and the law of phase harmony and the like.

 

Apparently added after your first edit right after your post.  Interestingly though my browser displayed the earlier version, the copy function copied your later version, which caught me by surprise.  This kind of discrepancy between browser display and what shows up in the copy function played a part in a major brouhaha that occurred shortly after I became a mod, in which we mods were actually accused of colluding with a member to alter his post to the detriment of another member, something which we would never do, and I think explains the phenomena quit nicely.  When I refreshed the page that displayed your earlier version, your new version showed up, but I would not have know about your editing it while looking at the unrefreshed page.  I'll have to bring this up in the "Star Chamber" because we were nonplussed both by the accusation and how the phenomena which the member experienced occurred, knowing that we had nothing to do with it, we tried to replicate it and failed, but now we have a clear answer to how this matter arose.

 

In any case I was going to thank you for the reference to the section in the video above and explain why I don't watch video's unless I absolutely, positively have to do so.  I appreciate your extended response, but now I don't have time to post further, and will have to come back later to respond to both parts of your post.

 

 

 

 

Edit: Corrected usage spelling error, "you" to your.

[Karl]

Ehh...that's not how the Leibnizean monad is used. The Leibnizean monad is said to be "windowless"---not interacting with anything per-se but self-configuring under the impetus of the universal prime-mover.

 

More specifically, the system of monads was designed to answer onotlogical and mereological questions. Questions concerning what is a proper part of something else. Likewise, where can there be subjects and aggregates and how we can differentiate and demarcate what-is-what.

 

After having spent more time on this, I am more inclined towards McTaggarts mereological ontology---but I have a gripe with his his method because he constructs the idea and then uses it to project restrictive conclusions about the universe at large (I'm willing to make asymptotic projections but his method doesn't do that since his construction of an ontological unit requires some gerrymandering). Regardless, McTaggart would be considered a hyper-essentialist (so you wouldn't find much to like in his work).

 

McTaggart has more in common with the above mention of monads (whereas monads are "windowless", McTaggarts idea of substance would be considered all window). In this way, it sounds similar to the distortion that I made about "monads" when relating them to the musical tetrad. I haven't looked too deeply into Proclus's work concerning henads but I think I recall you criticizing it as a book which was abstract to the point that it didn't talk about anything tangible. This, though, probably is a bit closer (to the above mention) than the canonical monads of Leibniz but it's not quite as open as McTaggart's system.

 

For any of these cases, existence is not a product of consciousness. Consciousness, however, is considered present alongside all existing things in some way. There is a generally unexplained coexistence of the two.

 

Whatever the case, I have been drawn more round-about to liking the scholastic metaphysics. Which, actually, has a bit in common with what you've mentioned about Rand's metaphysics (though I haven't read any in-depth things about Rand's metaphysics).

 

In any case, the scholastic use of potency instead of possibility is a key point that aligns to the article quite well. When we talk about possibility, we get a projective view possible things out of which one "actual" thing is selected. This has led to a number of the fallacy-ridden discussions about alternate universes. "Potency", in the scholastic metaphysic, though, will have the totality of an objects future be contingent upon the potentials that exist within it yet haven't been manifested. And so, the development of an object over the course of different conditions set upon it over time, will yield an "act" out of potency. In this case, the "act" is simply the act of being in the present moment in some way. The in-some-way is what makes different things distinct.

 

On this point, we should be able to see that the discussion of Milo Wolff's work, if we want to explore philosophical issues, ought to be considered in this light. There is a very empirical base and it doesn't jump to the abstract stuff of "information" or of discrete object-demarcations. There is a fuzzyness to objects born out of the interacting force-centers in a way similar to the act of concrescence in Whitehead's process metaphysics. (And the force-centers are more like nodes than specific conscious things---though I'd speculate that consciousness can be correlated to the degrees of freedom that the nodes have relative to the waves sent out and back).

 

So, instead of Leibniz, we're probably looking more at an Aquinas, Whitehead, Peirce and (maybe) Heidegger-styled scheme of metaphysics rather than anything officially Platonic.

I've read a bit of continental rationalism, but this isn't a subject I'm very familiar with so it gives me a chance to go away and study a bit more.

[9th]

Generally its the beating around the bush that seems to define most scholarly pursuits (in my eyes) and is thus why I lack the temperament for such endeavors - as Ive come to understand that such beating is more or less the point to begin with.  Which is to say; its not my thing, but clearly has its place.  I dont consider it a "lesser" or "greater" pursuit of knowledge, which is a stance that tends to effectively marginalize in general, it seems.

 

However Im very concerned with "boiling it down", and getting to the essence of things - getting to the crux of the matter, cutting to the chase, etc - however you want to put it.

 

Thus lacking the massive vocabulary and/or referential basis of commonly and uncommonly known information, it seems difficult to fully engage scholars who insist on the referential methodology of debate and discussion.  Accumulated referential data alone does not mean anything to me, whereas others seem to hold its esteem above all else.  But I do greatly value any connectivity of data which renders any degree of holistic understanding of its totality - and therefore of course, I especially value a great amount of connectivity between a great amount of data.

 

Anyways, the point that often seems lost in many theoretical models and systemology is the lack of accounting for the relativity of perception itself, which is consequently ignored in favor of attempts to work out the resulting problems that must proceed from such an oversight.  Lets take a "simple" prospect like 'free will' for example.  Does it exist, does it not exist?  Again the relativity of perception is immediately ignored in favor of an absolute (or "black and white") question and answer.  For example, if it is raining outside - you have the free will to put on a jacket or not, and yet you do not have the free will to stop the rain from falling.  This is a simple way of understanding the relativity of a simple situation.  And it can be further extrapolated to any degree you wish.

 

The absolutist tendencies of our so-called "rationality" seems to be a real issue in promoting a lack of understanding anything in general.  Its not logical.  Its not even "rational" but in reality it is highly "irrational" to think in terms of absolute terms that allow only the "either/or" proposition.  And this isnt even to say that such a proposition does not exist, but rather it does exist in the specific context of limitation itself - in other words, it clearly exists in a specific form.  Any specific form is by its very nature limited - that is what provides the definition of a form, the boundaries of its given parameters.

 

This is further illustrated by the very colloquialism that references absolute propositions, i.e. "black or white".  We can understand this a bit better by relating these terms to their closest relatives, i.e. "dark" and "light".  In reality, there is no such thing as "black and white" in terms of "dark and light".  Rather, these are simply references to the limits of our perception (in this case, visual) which are symbolically grafted onto a conceptualization of the "world" itself.  Our eyes can only perceive a very limited range of photonic activity (or light), which we have proven to ourselves with other instruments which measure their activity in ranges far beyond those which our eyes are privy to.  While black and white are colors and not specifically related to perception of light per se (other than the most obvious), the comparison is certainly applicable enough to get my point across, considering the way in which this colloquialism is used in conversation.

 

The limits of human perception therefore often define a basis of conceptualization, and even when this is recognized and acknowledged in a purely intellectual way in terms of the given theories and so forth - it often tends to impute a character to further arguments, perspectives and so forth even in spite of any previous acknowledgement.  This is why I often find that psychology itself tends to rule the day in any and all endeavors, even when people are striving their very utmost (and certainly claiming) to be "objective" in a sense of stepping outside the limitations of human perception and its inherently flawed subjectivity.  And even beyond this small example there are many other positions of relativity that tend to be overlooked and ignored, due to very specific psychological causes.  This obviously obfuscates any real pursuit of science.  

 

And when it comes to pursuing scientific and scholarly endeavors, there is obviously no prerequisite for overcoming the aspect of personal psychology that affords all manner of various detrimental subjective fallacies.  Like almost everything else in the human world, the subjective elements of egotism and dogmatism and emotionalism are often highly lauded and promoted in intellectual pursuits as well.  Again, the legacy of the psyche itself rules the day, and yet is the elephant in the room that no one will acknowledge. The presentation of authority which demands ignorance of any and all limitation should be the most thoroughly examined topic of all time, and yet its complete lack of examination is the very basis for most human endeavors.  And IMHO, when you start out on the wrong foot - you arent going anywhere except the wrong way.  

 

What Im saying is: it doesnt have to be that way.  Life doesnt have to be "a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing."  Unfortunately, that just seems to be the primary mode of humanity in general.  What we need to do is simple...  Make Earth great again.  Lets build a wall to keep this kind of shit out.  Fuck these goddamn rapist monkeys.  Grab life by the pussy!

[Karl]

Except you fall into the same hole that you are supposed to be avoiding. You state an absolute when stating 'there is no black and white' which is exactly a black and white absolutist view point.

 

Perception is perception, the universe experienced directly as it is. However, reality is what we are trying to figure out conceptually. We are making integrations and differentiations within our minds as we spin out beyond the direct perception. Reality is the confirmation that our conception accurately matches our perception.

[Karl]

Ehh...that's not how the Leibnizean monad is used. The Leibnizean monad is said to be "windowless"---not interacting with anything per-se but self-configuring under the impetus of the universal prime-mover.

 

More specifically, the system of monads was designed to answer onotlogical and mereological questions. Questions concerning what is a proper part of something else. Likewise, where can there be subjects and aggregates and how we can differentiate and demarcate what-is-what.

 

After having spent more time on this, I am more inclined towards McTaggarts mereological ontology---but I have a gripe with his his method because he constructs the idea and then uses it to project restrictive conclusions about the universe at large (I'm willing to make asymptotic projections but his method doesn't do that since his construction of an ontological unit requires some gerrymandering). Regardless, McTaggart would be considered a hyper-essentialist (so you wouldn't find much to like in his work).

 

McTaggart has more in common with the above mention of monads (whereas monads are "windowless", McTaggarts idea of substance would be considered all window). In this way, it sounds similar to the distortion that I made about "monads" when relating them to the musical tetrad. I haven't looked too deeply into Proclus's work concerning henads but I think I recall you criticizing it as a book which was abstract to the point that it didn't talk about anything tangible. This, though, probably is a bit closer (to the above mention) than the canonical monads of Leibniz but it's not quite as open as McTaggart's system.

 

For any of these cases, existence is not a product of consciousness. Consciousness, however, is considered present alongside all existing things in some way. There is a generally unexplained coexistence of the two.

 

Whatever the case, I have been drawn more round-about to liking the scholastic metaphysics. Which, actually, has a bit in common with what you've mentioned about Rand's metaphysics (though I haven't read any in-depth things about Rand's metaphysics).

 

In any case, the scholastic use of potency instead of possibility is a key point that aligns to the article quite well. When we talk about possibility, we get a projective view possible things out of which one "actual" thing is selected. This has led to a number of the fallacy-ridden discussions about alternate universes. "Potency", in the scholastic metaphysic, though, will have the totality of an objects future be contingent upon the potentials that exist within it yet haven't been manifested. And so, the development of an object over the course of different conditions set upon it over time, will yield an "act" out of potency. In this case, the "act" is simply the act of being in the present moment in some way. The in-some-way is what makes different things distinct.

 

On this point, we should be able to see that the discussion of Milo Wolff's work, if we want to explore philosophical issues, ought to be considered in this light. There is a very empirical base and it doesn't jump to the abstract stuff of "information" or of discrete object-demarcations. There is a fuzzyness to objects born out of the interacting force-centers in a way similar to the act of concrescence in Whitehead's process metaphysics. (And the force-centers are more like nodes than specific conscious things---though I'd speculate that consciousness can be correlated to the degrees of freedom that the nodes have relative to the waves sent out and back).

 

So, instead of Leibniz, we're probably looking more at an Aquinas, Whitehead, Peirce and (maybe) Heidegger-styled scheme of metaphysics rather than anything officially Platonic.

Is it possible you could define what you mean by monad ?

[Karl]

I get that you think of it is a perceptual fractal so far, but this would require consciousness to be present in every thing. This would be a consciousness unconscious of anything, which is clearly a conflicting statement. A chair, or rock is not perceptual conscious, it is not alive, so however the monads assembled, they did not produce consciousness on those two occasions.

 

I have no issue with there being something at the base of matter. I don't know what that is, but I do know that whatever it might be will have an identity, it will be something and it will have a nature of some kind. It will be an existent.

 

The problem I see today is an over reliance on conceptual modelling and an under reliance on experimentation and direct observation. It's seems as like if we can think it, then we can do it. So that we mindfully divide something with existent identity until it can't be divided and therefore it is said to have no identity nor existence. A something that is nothing becomes the basis of everything and we can immediately see what is represented here-consciousness as nothing, when it is clearly something. Consciousness has identity even if it has no solid form, it's not a material thing in itself, but it is an integral part of a specific living entity.

[Karl]

That's why I regard existence and consciousness as an axiomatic couplet. In other words existence has eventually produced a consciousness of it. In a sense it is as much a mistake to give existence a conceptual label, without a conceptual consciousness that is able to label it. There is no 'out there' in the conceptual sense if no consciousness is there to percieve it, just as a consciousness devoid of existence is invalid. That's not to say existence is not primary, just that if there is no one around the witness it, then existence would be unexamined.

 

A self creating universe of acting and interacting entities must be capable of a line of causality resulting in a form of creative entity that is something of a prime mover with the universe of laws. It can only be creative if it has motive propulsion and a purpose which is its basic survival. Eventually higher levels of life must form with greater capacities to grasp existence directly, then some kind of consciousness that can grasp it conceptually.

Edited November 14, 2016 by Karl

[Michael Sternbach]

As it is reflecting the incoming wave(s), each monadic centre indeed mirrors all others. My favourite metaphor for this is the pearl net of the sky king Indra. (The internet can be seen as a dim reflection of Indra's net, btw.)

Edited November 14, 2016 by Michael Sternbach